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Abstract 
Previous studies on the Nigerian parallel market found "return predictability". Based on 
this finding, we quantify, using Hansen's GMM estimation technique, the risk-return 
characteristics implicit in the simplest trading strategy of "buy and hold" an optimal 
portfolio of currencies. The risk-return profile suggests that profitable trading opportunities 
found in the Nigerian market may not indeed be exploitable. 
Also, we reexamine the evidence on the presence of destabilizing activities in the 
Nigerian parallel market. Using the noise-trader approach, we find no significant evidence 
of bandwagon expectations that may drive prices gradually away from fundamentals. 
The overall implication of our findings is clear. If the emerging characteristics of the 
new autonomous market are similar to the parallel market that it seeks to absorb, then an 
activist intervention policy, based mainly on market-stability imperatives, should be 
resisted strongly. 
I. Introduction 
We pursue two issues relating to market efficiency. First we test empirically for the 
existence of profitable trading opportunities based on the apparent weak-form inefficiency 
of the Nigerian foreign exchange parallel market. Second, we investigate the presence 
of destabilizing speculative activities. An asset market is efficient if prices fully reflect 
all available information so that economic profits can not be earned through exploiting 
this information set. Different levels of efficiency can be distinguished depending on 
how much information is used to form expectations about future prices - weak form, 
semi-strong form and strong form (Fama, 1970). Subsequently, Fama reclassified forms 
of efficiency under the general titles of return predictability, events study and tests for 
private information (Fama, 1991). Bandwagons or destabilizing expectations occur when 
market participants extrapolate the most recent trend in exchange rates. On the other 
hand, regressive expectations occur when agents expect a currency to return to some 
equilibrium level. The importance of distinguishing between destabilizing speculation 
and regressive expectation has long been recognized in the literature. One view, proposed 
initially by Freidman (1953), is that because speculators buy low and sell high, their 
activity ensures that exchange rates reflect the fundamental or long-run determinants of 
currency values. Another strand of literature led by Nurske (see Froot and Thaler, 1990) 
holds that speculation in foreign exchange can be destabilizing and that excess volatility 
imposes large costs on producers, who consequently make less efficient allocative 
decisions1. 
In developing countries, the perception of policy makers on this debate is important, 
as it may lead to positions that could trigger market interventions. Consider, for example, 
that the potential cost of exchange rate instability includes the possibility that investors 
may adopt a wait-and-see attitude when confronted with uncertain future exchange rate 
changes. This is particularly likely in import-dependent small economies with essentially 
one main export commodity. More recently, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) analysed the 
effect of uncertainty on investment behaviour. One of their major insights is that "changing 
economic conditions that affect the perceived riskiness of future cash flows can have a 
large impact on investment spending, larger than, say a change in interest rates." 
Undoubtedly, volatile exchange rates affect future cash flows. 
Two previous studies (Ogiogio, 1994; Ayogu 1995) on the foreign exchange markets 
in Nigeria addressed the issue of market efficiency and speculative activities in the parallel 
market. Ogiogio (1994) finds dependence between successive price changes in the foreign 
exchange markets using an autocorrelation test on monthly data from 1989 to 1993. 
Ogiogio (1994) also analysed the relative contributions from expectations and from 
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economic fundamentals to the movement of exchange rates. The study concluded that 
"the most significant factor in the movement of the nominal exchange rate in Nigeria is 
speculation by dealers". 
Ogiogio (1994) regressed exchange rates (using OLS) on the ratio of inflows to 
outflows of foreign currencies. The intuition is that the relative flow of currencies 
summarizes the supply and demand conditions in the market, so that any residual from 
such regression could be attributed to speculative activities. The analysis did not explain 
how data on the flow variables were constructed given that, in such an informal market, 
the only accessible data are transaction prices. Also, no discussion was made on the 
econometric issues involved in using such an approach. What is more important, the 
study did not make clear how speculative activities (if present) were to be detected from 
the residuals. 
These issues aside, the claim that speculative activities are significant in the market 
differs from the finding of no price level bubbles by Ayogu (1995). Ayogu (1995) uses 
vector autoregression analysis and the nonlinear algorithm of Hamilton (1989) to search 
for trend processes in exchange rate data filtered through economic fundamentals. This 
paper, which extends that result, equally fails to find evidence of significant noise trading 
in the market. 
This present paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the development of 
the parallel forex market in Nigeria and Section III looks at the risk/return characteristics 
implicit in this simplest trading strategy of "buy and hold" an optimal portfolio of 
currencies. Section IV examines the issue of speculative dynamics-the presence of 
noise traders in the market. Noise trading [Black (1986), Campbell and Kyle (1988), De 
Long, Bradford, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1989,1990a,b)] has become a popular 
alternative to the efficient-markets approach. Moreover, the approach accommodates 
within the same analytical framework, the two competing views-Friedman and Nurske-
on the effect of speculative activities on the economy. According to the accommodating 
view, both types of traders coexist. The issue is whether the activities of noise (as opposed 
to rational) traders are significant, or dominate the market. Our study ends with a summary 
and the conclusions from our findings in Section V. We begin with presenting a 
background on the nature of the parallel market that we analyse. 
II. The parallel forex market in Nigeria 
The evolution of foreign exchange markets in Nigeria has influenced by several factors 
over time, including political dynamics, the changing pattern of international trade and 
institutional changes in the economy (such as structural shifts in production). It is a fair 
characterization to say that Nigeria's foreign exchange rate management policy varied 
according to episodic changes in its fortunes. For example, during the 1970s when the 
country enjoyed economic prosperity from the oil boom, the supply of foreign currency 
was not an issue of great concern, and an administered exchange rate regime existed 
without a formal criterion for rationing demand. Nevertheless, in the 1980s, as part of 
the reform process designed to restore the economy on a growth path including access to 
international capital, a new foreign exchange policy thrust was evident. Specifically, in 
1986 a floating rate mechanism linked to market forces was introduced. 
The earliest history of transactions in Nigeria's parallel market was at the outbreak of 
World War II, mainly in United States dollars and Swiss francs; Switzerland at the time 
was for Nigerians a preferred haven for money laundering. Nevertheless, the development 
of the market is rooted in the myriad of exchange controls in existence then. Examples 
include controls on payments for imports; on payments for, and proceeds from, invisibles; 
on the treatment of proceeds from exports (cocoa, rubber, palm produce, hides and skins, 
cotton, groundnut, and tin ore were major exports at the time); and on both direct and 
portfolio investments. Initially the participants were mainly expatriate entrepreneurs 
(Lebanese traders were prominent), exporters, politicians and some importers. 
During the Nigerian civil war (1966-1970) and after, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
continued to control the operation of the formal market with the goal of stabilizing the 
value of the naira, but the parallel market premium continued to increase monotonically. 
The result was a variety of regulatory-induced behaviour such as under invoicing of 
exports and over invoicing of imports. Other effects were capital flight and the arbitraging 
of foreign currencies acquired at below market-clearing rates in the official market. 
However, the prominence of the parallel market in the scheme of economic activities is 
rooted in the early 1980s when the economy swung into distress. 
Between 1986 and February 1992, various foreign exchange reforms were introduced 
and experimented with.2 Unfortunately, the government was unable to reverse the 
continuous depreciation of the nation's currency as reflected in the almost monotonically 
increasing parallel market premium (see figure 1). Presumably as an ultimate solution to 
a disturbing trend, the authorities in March 1992 opted for a complete deregulation of 
the system of foreign exchange trading. Consequently the parallel market premium 
reduced to what was probably only a transaction-costs differential. Subsequently it became 
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obvious that the convergence was transient because the inter-bank foreign exchange 
market continued to be characterized by excess demand for foreign currencies.3In recent 
times, the importance of this market has grown tremendously as transaction prices (both 
wholesale and retail) in the real and service sectors including embassies and foreign 
missions in Nigeria are implicitly indexed to the parallel rate. Nigeria has become a 
nation of foreign exchange watchers. It is not a national pastime. It is a full-time watch. 
No formal organization of the parallel market exist. To say that the market is ubiquitous 
is a true characterization. It is to be found on the curbs, under staircases, on the landings 
of staircases between floors of storied buildings, inside shacks, in business bureaus, 
inside restaurants, hotel lobbies, airport lounges, outside on parking lots, and so forth. 
Any imaginable place qualifies as a dealing spot providing the parties to the resulting 
transaction feel secure. As the market gained in importance, and became more lucrative, 
it attracted a variety of entrants. Noteworthy are entrepreneurs who adapted their 
enterprises to the booming "money-changing business". Entry into the business and the 
competition it engendered greatly improved the reputation and infrastructure of the market. 
Within a given area, more transactions began to occur in fixed locations with a greater 
weight of reputational capital attached to transactions. The count accuracy of notes 
exchanged and the genuineness of currencies traded became important dimensions of 
competition in the market. 
This is a long way in a short span of time for a market that was previously operated by 
a collection of footloose agents, some operating for own accounts and others as agents 
for politically powerful principals. Perhaps this diversity, coupled with the boom times 
that the market continued to enjoy, promoted the growth in the diversity of trading posts. 
These posts varied from street corners to air conditioned shacks. The shacks featured 
"bosses" fully decked with business cards, cellular telephones, regular telephones, 
facsimile machines and desk-top personal computers. Those who did not have telephones 
installed could easily reach one, and some curbside agents were linked to their principals 
through cellular phones. As more profits induced entry, which increased competition, 
profit margins narrowed. So, dealers began to take advantage of economies of scope to 
offer complementary business services such as facsimile transmission, outgoing telephone 
call service and photocopying. Although the precise volume of trade in the parallel 
market is unknown, it is estimated at below that of the official market. Nonetheless, the 
number of deals completed in the parallel market undoubtedly exceeds that of the official 
market as the parallel market is the "only market of resort" for most agents. Moreover, 
some of the currencies traded in the official market are supplied, through the arbitrage 
process, to the parallel market. 
This review describes the state of the parallel market before January 1995. In January 
1995, as part of a new agenda of "guided deregulation of the foreign exchange market", 
the government effected a key foreign exchange policy change. The gist of the policy 
change is contained in the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Decree 1995 otherwise known as Decree No. 17 of 1995. Essentially the decree introduced 
the Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market while retaining the official exchange at the 
pegged rate of 22 naira per US dollar. All purchasers of foreign currencies from then on 
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Figure 1: Parallel market premium 
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Table 1: Rate Profile In the Foreign Exchange Markets: 1995:QI 
Official AFEM Bureaus Parallel 
January 21.996 _ 21.770* 80.340 
February 21.996 82.000 81.200 80.640 
March 21.996 82.000 83.760 83.390 
Source: NDIC Quarterly. March 1995. 
AFEM = autonomous foreign exchange market. * denotes buying rate. 
were required to transact at rates that would be freely determined in the autonomous 
market. However, "designated government transactions" continue to be processed at the 
central bank using the fixed rate. No individuals or organizations unless authorized are 
to deal in foreign exchange; so the parallel market remains proscribed. 
The introduction of the autonomous market has prompted a reconfiguration - changes 
in the number and size distribution of the firms and operators - of the parallel market. 
Many of the "well-connected" principals and the fancy shacks with fax machines and 
desk-tops are either restructuring as de novo forex bureaus or are consolidating (through 
mergers or buyouts) with existing outfits. In either case, they retain their remote probes 
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(curbside operators and agents) to solicit business. As things stand, it is no longer clear 
where the parallel market ends and the forex bureau begins. Table 1 shows the rate profile 
in the market for the first quarter after the regime change. 
III. Speculative efficiency 
Next, we turn to the measurement of the risk-return profile implicit in the parallel 
market. The method used requires a model describing how returns are generated (i.e., a 
return forecasting equation) under the assumed null hypothesis that the market 
is"efficient". In the empirical literature, efficiency is usually equated with rational 
expectations plus the martingale model (Leroy, 1989). We consider the hypothesis 
independently of its implications for rational expectations, so we use the term speculative 
efficiency to stress the focus on opportunities for risk adjusted excess returns. 
The speculative-efficiency approach boasts extensive literature. The growth of the 
literature is motivated by the search for alternative formulations of market efficiency, 
and in particular for those formulations aimed at directly testing for the existence of 
profitable trading opportunities, quite independent of the implications for rational 
expectations. Examples are Bilson (1981), Dooley and Shafer (1982), Bilson and Hsieh 
(1983), and Hodrick and Srivastava (1984). Presumably these formulations attempt to 
reduce the interpretive problems associated with the rejection of market efficiency (and 
so the ambiguity in constructing alternatives to the null of efficiency). These ambiguities 
arise because failure to find evidence in favour of the null may imply either a rejection of 
the information set, perhaps on the basis that agents are rational but have the wrong 
model, or that the information set contains all relevant information but agents are 
(irrationally?) failing to use all available information. 
Empirical methodology 
To parameterize the null hypothesis, we specify a model that characterizes the process 
determining the future evolution of the parallel rate. We preface our specification by 
noting that economic models have generally not done well in explaining movements in 
exchange rates. Similarly, the profession has not reached a consensus on the appropriate 
set of fundamental factors to include in an exchange rate equation (Meese, 1990). A 
large and growing literature argues that the standard theoretical models of exchange rate 
determination - the flexible - price monetary model of Frenkel (1976), which assumes 
both purchasing power parity (PPP) and uncovered interest parity (UIP), and the 
sticky-price overshooting model of Dornbusch (1976) that assumes only UlP-do not 
explain empirically the actual exchange rate behaviour in post 1973 regimes of floating 
exchange rates. Following a suggestion in Mussa (1979) that a random walk outperforms 
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a wide array of structural models in out-of-sample forecasts, Meese and Rogoff (1983a/ 
b) found that even the random walk is not a very good predictor of exchange rate behaviour. 
Koedijk and Schotman (1990) and Somanath (1986) have argued that the use of lagged 
adjustments in structural models can lead to forecasts outperforming the random walk 
models. Such results have been explained as responses to shocks in a learning process 
that is slow (Tabellini, 1988; Lewis, 1989a,/b). More recent works on exchange rate 
movements have used the error correction model. Examples are Kim and Mo (1995) and 
Naka and Whitney (1995). 
Other efforts to improve our understanding of exchange rate changes have tried to 
exploit the statistical properties of exchange rates. For example, the distributions of 
exchange rates generally exhibit various non-normalities. Evidence of leptokurtosis in 
exchange rates has been found by various researchers (Westerfield, 1977; Boothe and 
Glassman, 1987). Cumby and Obstfeld (1984) first noticed the existence of volatility 
clustering or conditional heteroscedasticity. Efforts to model this volatility cluster have 
been made by Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) and Diebold (1988), using the ARCH 
technique of Engle (1982). Also, efforts have been made by McCurdy and Morgan (1989) 
and Hodrick (1989) using the EARCH technique of Bollerslev (1986). Boothe and 
Glassman (1987) and Hsieh (1988) have fit Student and mixed normals but found shifting 
parameters over time. Tucker and Pond (1988) and Akgiray and Booth (1988) found the 
mixed diffusion-jump process of Clark (1973) and Merton (1976) to be superior to the 
mixed normals, although the latter found parameters changing with policy regime shifts. 
This apparent non-normality and volatility, along with the obvious failure of standard 
structural models, led to a search for other possible explanations for the behaviour of 
exchange rates. 
We do not attempt to resolve the issue here. Instead, we have tried to provide a 
perspective on how, based on the state of the literature, the choice of a model can vary 
considerably. Our choice of forecasting equation is a more general empirical specification 
that allows both for a random walk, with or without a drift, and for a stationarity around 
a trend function (Perron, 1989). By defining y.( as the spot rate of naira per unit of 
foreign currency i for period t, e.t as a purely random error term, and t as the trend 
component, we may specify a forecasting equation under the null hypothesis that the 
market is weak-form efficient. 
yit +1 = bi0 + bnt + bi2yu + ejl+l< i = !,...,». (1) 
Appropriately parameterized, the null hypothesis that "you can't beat the market" 
asserts H0: (bffbl,b2)=( 0,0,1). If the null is true, however, it cannot be tested as specified 
because the distribution is unknown and does not converge to a Gaussian process 
asymptotically. Therefore the null hypothesis is reparameterized by specifying the 
following empirical models based on tests proposed in Dickey and Fuller (1981): 
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V'Y, = a + (3t + 0Yt.x + X 7,V1 ( M o d e l U) (2) 
i=i 
and 
K 
V ' Y ^ I r . - V ' Y ^ , (Model R) (3) 
f=i 
where 0=(b2- l)and V'denotes the ith difference of (Y t}.e f~iid(0,o2). The composite 
null hypothesis H0 asserts (cc, fi,9) = (0,0,0), and / . ' s = 0 (i =1,..., K), which implies the 
weaker martingale property that expected changes in the time series {K} are zero. The 
test statistic (j>2 is the likelihood ratio test of (b0,bvb2) * (0,0,1) against the alternative (b0, 
bx, b2) * (0,0,1). The critical values - found in Table V of Dickey and Fuller (1981) - for 
the 5% (1%) level test are <|>2 = 4.88 (6.50) for sample size Te (100,360). These statistics 
are computed as a standard F test of this restriction; the restricted regression is labelled 
Model R and the unrestricted is labelled Model U.4The significance of y's is assessed by 
appealing to the fact that the asymptotic distributions of t statistics on yt's (i =l,...,/c) are 
standardized normal. 
The result of the specification test is tabulated in Table 2. Reported p-values are for 
the lagged exchange rates. The values imply statistically significant coefficients. The 
computed Dickey and Fuller (j»2 statistics indicate (b0,bvb2) ^ (0,0,l).Together, these 
specification test results lead us not to set to zero any of the coefficients in the forecasting 
equation. Accordingly, our forecasting equation is specified as: 
where e.( is an error term. This error term may follow a more complicated process that 
captures market characteristics such as volatility cluster (i.e., the presence of ARCH). 
Furthermore, by defining a vector of portfolio weights W = (w r..wn)', where w. s a non 
negative proportion of the speculators' wealth invested in currency i, we may express 
the speculators' problem: To minimize the level of diversifiable risk p in the portfolio of 
foreign currencies given a target level of return II*. The non negativity restriction on the 
portfolio weights rules out "short selling". 
Formally, the traders need to find W* so that there exists no other portfolio with either 
(1) a higher return and a lower risk, (2) a higher return at the same level of risk, or (3) the 
same level of return at a lower risk. That is, W* solves the following quadratic 
programming problem: 
K 
(4) 
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min p = W AW 
W * 
(5) 
subject to 
(/) W'l = 1 
(ii) W'e = 11* 
where A is the variance-covariance matrix of forecast errors generated by estimating 
Equation 4. The estimation method assumes the following error structure. The disturbance 
term for a given currency follows a p t h order autoregressive process; the variance of the 
disturbance can differ among currencies and within the same currency across periods, 
and the disturbances for different currencies are contemporaneously correlated (i.e., eit 
heteroscedastic and autocorrelated). Also, the following cross-equation restrictions hold: 
The cross-equation restrictions and the assumptions together say that all coefficients 
are constant and have the same value across all currency types (except possibly for the 
intercepts), and that the disturbance vector is assumed to capture differences over time 
and currencies. An efficient estimation method is Hansen's generalized method of 
moments (GMM)..As implemented, GMM allows for conditional heteroscedasticity of 
the disturbances, and when the option is invoked (in the TSP routine [Hall, 1995]) 
computes the correct weighting matrix to ensure asymptotically efficient estimators in 
the presence of serial correlation. A similar approach to the same problem was used in 
Hodrick and Srivastava (1984), although Bilson (1982) obtains his estimates using SUR 
and GLS procedure. 
Constraint (i) in Equation 5 simply says that agents are required to exhaust their 
wealth. This requirement ensures that the portfolio choices are optimal given wealth 
constraints. The constraint also represents our priors that even if some risk-neutral or 
risk-loving speculators exist, they are likely to confront liquidity (wealth) constraints. 
The assumption of limited access to capital seems highly in accord with empirical 
observations on capital markets, and consistent with theories of capital markets under 
asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In fact, liquidity constraint is an 
important consideration in the literature on speculative dynamics. Shleifer and Summers 
(1990) argue that if agents have finite horizons and wealth constraints are binding, then 
arbitrage is limited. Such limitation prevents the process of arbitrage from completely 
driving prices toward fundamentals. In any event, the market that we analyse operates a 
cash—in—advance scheme with little if any "short selling" of currencies occurring as a 
regular feature. 
Constraint (ii), which defines required return as J1 = We, may be interpreted as the 
agents' reservation return, below which they are unwilling to hold a portfolio. The 
portfolio-efficient frontier is constructed by varying IT. The efficient frontier provides 
the framework for the analysis of the optimal risk/return trade-offs implicit in the parallel 
market. 
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Data and empirical analysis 
We use weekly data on four major trading currencies - dollar, sterling, Deutsche mark, 
and French franc - collected over the period 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1993. Our 
coverage begins in 1990 simply because that was how far back we could go to obtain 
clean data. As stated in the institutional description, parallel market activities became 
more tolerated in 1989 when forex bureaus were introduced. This development encouraged 
a more active habit of publishing parallel market rates. Publication and dissemination 
halted in January 1994 when the government became intolerant of the parallel market. 
The present data set was compiled from published rates in Nigerian periodicals - the 
Guardian and the Business Times. The choice of data frequency is made to approximate 
the holding period horizon of traders. Traders in this market rarely hold positions in 
currencies for more than several days at a time. 
Table 3 presents summary descriptive statistics of the data set. Table 4 reports the 
estimates of the mean (ex post) forecast errors, g , which is the proxy for the expected 
forecast error. Table 5 contains the standardized variance-covariance matrix of the 
residuals (A ).5 
A basic feature of the portfolio-efficient frontier (Figure 2) is that the representative 
investor's minimum variance portfolio implied in the frontier is diversified - 53% in 
dollars and 47% percent in Deutsche marks.6 While it is generally reassuring to have an 
outcome consistent with theory (our benchmark portfolio conforms with the doctrine 
that diversification is beneficial when returns are less than perfectly correlated), that fact 
is only of passing interest in the present study. The reason is that in the market we 
analyse, few investors if any are likely to hold the minimum variance portfolio in the 
presence of a risk-free asset that yields a higher return. Therefore, what we seek instead 
is to establish the equilibrium portfolio for the investor. The existence of a risk-free asset 
with a positive yield enables us to construct a market opportunity line for our representative 
investor. We use a typical yield on treasury bills issued over the period spanned by the 
data. Within this period, yields have varied from 16.65% to 28%. For treasury rates 
below 25.5%, and assuming that regularity conditions concerning the investor's 
preferences are satisfied, portfolio equilibrium involves a positive position in the parallel 
market.7 When returns are above 25.5%, investors can obtain a risk-return combination 
that Pareto dominates that of the parallel market. This volatile investment opportunity, 
which is due to the linear efficient frontier, is consistent with Hodrick and Srivastava 
(1984). That study concluded that "it would appear from [looking to] the volatility of the 
risk-return tradeoffs at different points in time that a speculator in foreign exchange must 
be willing to bear a considerable amount of risk". 
Whether agents hold "positions" is an empirical question that cannot be answered 
from the data. However, a survey of the market participants sheds some light on the 
issue. Evidence from an informal survey of dealers and views from market observers tell 
that traders rarely accumulate or short currencies based chiefly on expectations of future 
movements in those currencies. Therefore, readers must be circumspect in assessing the 
survey outcome, given that "demand characteristics" influence the reliability of survey 
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responses. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence from periodicals that cover Nigerian 
financial markets (Business Times, for example) suggests that offers-for-sale of treasury 
securities during open market sessions are usually oversubscribed. The feeling is that 
some authorized foreign exchange dealers who are successful at purchasing currencies 
at the highly subsidized official rates promptly dispose of these assets in the parallel 
market. After that, the proceeds are invested in treasury securities, rather than used in 
speculative trading of currencies. Although we do not know whether there are many 
passive investors (those who "buy and hold" foreign exchange), we know (judging from 
a description of the market structure) that there are agents who "make a market" in 
currencies. What is also well known is that for most Nigerians the parallel market is the 
only de facto accessible foreign exchange market. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
many dealers trade to satisfy customers' orders for foreign currencies to finance 
international trade and other similar transactions. 
There is also the possibility of "currency substitution" as part of the portfolio demand 
for currencies. Increased use of foreign currencies in many countries has led to a 
substantial literature on "currency substitution" and its implications for seignorage. Heavy 
usage of foreign currencies generally has occurred in countries with high and variable 
inflation rates and where the rate of currency depreciation has been high and variable as 
well. In such economies the opportunity costs of holding domestic currency are high, 
leading residents to use foreign currency for savings and even transactions. Various studies 
have documented the hypothesized positive association between exchange rate 
depreciation and the extent of "dollarization", as the phenomenon has been known, 
particularly in Latin America.8 
The next issue is whether there is money to be made based on the apparent market 
inefficiency. To address this question, we calculated the risk-return trade-offs implicit in 
the market, with our estimates confined to the standardized profits (return/risk) generated 
along the portfolio-efficient frontier. Similar estimates were made in Bilson (1981), 
Bilson and Hsieh (1983), and Hodrick and Srivastava (1984). According to estimates 
from the portfolio frontier, the mean value of the standardized profit is 0.4789 with a 
standard error of 0.0349. Chi-squared test for normality is rejected for the standardized 
profits series. Consequently, we use Chebyshev's rule for placing the confidence interval. 
Using the three-standard-deviations criterion, a standardized profit of 0.50 from the market 
implies that with 88.90% confidence, we can infer that for every dollar speculators expect 
to make, they can expect anything from a loss of $2.50 to a gain of $3.50. This may be 
quite a swing, especially if the prospect is restated as anything from a loss of $250 to a 
gain of $350. On its own merit, the outcome is better than a fair bet, but compared with 
estimates of profits from developed markets, this profit potential implicit in the Nigerian 
market is far from enticing. Bilson (1981) reports a mean value of0.929 for standardized 
profits. Bilson's value is approximately twice the return from our market, although 
Boothe and Longworth (1986) report that Bilson and Hsieh's (1983) simulations yield a 
mean value of 0.4342. 
Considered in absolute terms without knowledge about the preferences of individuals, 
we are unable to assess whether the disutility from the prospect of losing $2.50 exceeds 
the utility associated with gaining $3.50. Thus we cannot rule categorically on whether 
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the outcome is a favourable gamble to market participants. Thaler (1994) explored this 
important matter of human behaviour under uncertainty. Thaler's brief uses interesting 
insights from psychology: concepts such as status quo bias (a preference for the current 
state) and endowment effects (the fact that people often demand more to give up an 
object than they are willing to pay to acquire it). He considers both revealed traits to be 
anomalies of economic behaviour that nonetheless portray an asymmetry of value. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) call this asymmetry of value, loss aversion}. From our 
discussion, we may infer that some heavy burden lies on the prospect of profiting from 
those apparent inefficiencies uncovered in many studies of asset markets. 
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Table 2: Specification test results for Equations 2 and 3 
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Currency <t>2 tY p-value K 
Dollar 6.07 -2.700 0.0075 4 
Sterling 8.63 3.241 0.0014 4 
Mark 6.66 -4.650 0 . 0 0 0 0 7 
Franc 7.09 -6.110 0 . 0 0 0 0 4 
Notes: The currencies are expressed in log units. The equations estimated are 
V 1 Y t = a + pt + 6Yt_l+ j y-V Y , _ , •+£, unrestricted and V1 Y, = 7AYi-i + Ei • restricted. For each 
regression, the selected lag length ensures no autocorrelation in residuals. For each currency ty is reported for 
the most significant lag value. Where values of K differ across (the restricted and the unrestricted) regressions, 
reported values are for the longer of the lag lengths. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the data 1990:1 1993:52 
Currency Mean Min Max Std Skewedness Excess 
deviation kurtosis 
dollar 20.2504 9.1000 48.5000 0.5118 0.4101 -1.0895 
sterling 32.9897 15.0000 69.3000 0.4490 0.1757 -1.1609 
mark 12.7308 5.2000 28.8000 0.5175 0.3108 -1.2261 
franc 3.6054 1.3000 8.5000 0.5225 0.1674 -1.1991 
Notes: The mean, minimum (min) and maximum (max) values are from the exchange rate series in their levels. 
The rest of the statistics relate to the transformed data (log levels). Sample size is 208. 
Table 4: GMM estimates of the mean of the forecast errors, g 
£ 
Dollar 
Sterling 
Mark 
Franc 
0.0525 
0.0552 
0.0199 
-0.0064 
Table 5: GMM estimates: Matrix of correlation of residuals, A 
Dollar Sterling Mark Franc 
Dollar 1.0000 
Sterling 0.7848 1.0000 
Mark 0.4877 0.5326 1.0000 
Franc 0.2175 0.2514 0.1919 1.0000 
IV. Speculative dynamics 
This section (which conceptually relies extensively on Shleifer and Summers, 1990) 
explores the issue of speculative dynamics - the presence of noise traders in the market, 
a recent and now popular alternative to the efficient markets approach. The noise-trader 
approach has been used in the asset market literature to account for the gradual swing of 
prices away from fundamentals. This is considered more plausible than the explosive 
divergence of prices from fundamentals implied by the literature on bubbles. The 
noise-trader approach is based on two assumptions. First, that some investors are not 
fully rational and that their demand for risky assets is affected by beliefs and sentiments 
not fully justified by fundamental news. Second, that arbitrage - defined as trading by 
fully rational investors not subject to such sentiment - is risky and therefore limited 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1990). Taken together, the two assumptions imply that changes 
in investor sentiment are not fully countered by abritrageurs and so affect asset returns. 
To motivate the discussion, we review two normative issues relevant to the evaluation 
of noise trading. (1) Should something be done to prevent noise traders from 
self-destructing? Presumably investors who trade on noise fare worse than if their 
expectations were rational (De Long et al., 1989,1990a). If so, why would rational traders 
not exploit the behaviour, and thus eliminate them?9 Shleifer and Summers explain that 
optimal trading by rational agents will completely reverse the effects of irrational trades 
on prices only if the rational agents are well financed (wealth constraints not binding) 
and risk-neutral. (2) Do noise traders impose a cost on the rest of the market participants 
and, if so, how can the cost be reduced? It turns out that noise trading can also affect the 
welfare of the rest of the community. One such effect is to benefit abritrageurs who take 
advantage of noise traders. "These benefits accrue to those who bet against noise traders 
and to those who feed their demand by providing financial services much in the same 
way as societies institute state lotteries, build casinos and racetracks even though 
benevolent observers know that they [the gamblers] are being taken to the cleaners 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1990). Of course some of these benefits to abritrageurs are also 
social opportunity costs as valuable human and other resources are allocated to separating 
noise traders from their money. The author is aware of one case in which a highly skilled 
and successful produce grower and marketer who has been in business for over 30 years 
turned into a currency dealer by converting his produce outlet into a dealing room.10 
Many other examples abound. Adaptive response of the kind we have in mind has already 
been described as part of the institutional background of the parallel market. 
Our formal analysis of speculative dynamics begins with the argument that the 
efficient-markets hypothesis obtains only as an extreme case of perfect risk-free arbitrage, 
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which is unlikely to apply in practice. Also, that the foreign exchange market consists of 
two types of investors: abritrageurs and other investors. Abritrageurs, also called "smart 
money" and "rational speculators", are defined as investors who form fully rational 
expectations about asset returns. In contrast, the expectations and trading behaviours of 
other investors - also known as "noise traders" and "liquidity traders" - may be subject 
to systematic biases. Trading by abritrageurs drives prices toward fundamentals (at least, 
so the argument goes). 
Unfortunately, however, two types of risk limit arbitrage. The first is fundamental 
risk - there is always a chance that the market will do very well (perform poorly). The 
second source of risk, which may or may not be related to the first comes from the 
unpredictability of future resale price (De Long et al., 1990a). As long as the abritrageurs 
are thinking of liquidating their position in the future (the abritrageur's horizon is finite), 
they must bear the risk that at that time, mispricing is more extreme. Fear of loss from 
either or both types of risk (inherent in uncertainties of the market) limits the size of the 
abritrageurs' initial position, and so keeps them from moving the price completely toward 
fundamentals. Furthermore, an abritrageur may not know the fundamental value of the 
asset (i.e., have the correct model linking information to returns) or in fact be able to 
detect price changes that reflect deviations from fundamentals. In such a case an 
abritrageur is then beleaguered by the difficulty of identifying the mispricing, and by the 
risk of betting against it. 
There is growing evidence, mostly from stock market studies (Harris and Gurel, 1986; 
Shleifer, 1986; Ritter, 1988; French and Roll, 1986; Roll, 1988; Cutler et al., 1989) that 
news alone does not move asset prices; uninformed changes in demand move them too." 
Changes in demand can also reflect investors' use of inflexible trading strategies such as 
obtain with some institutional traders that "go by their rule book", or of "popular models" 
described in Shiller (1990). 12 One such strategy is trend chasing. 
Proponents of this view argue that the key to investment success 
is not just predicting future fundamentals, but also predicting the 
movement of other active investors. We are reminded that market 
professionals spend considerable resources tracking price trends, 
trading volume, investor sentiment indexes, and many other gauges 
of demand for assets. Tracking these possible indicators of demand 
makes no sense if prices responded only to fundamental news and 
not to investor demand. They make perfect sense, in contrast, in 
a world where investor sentiment moves prices and so predicting 
changes in their sentiment pays. (Shleifer and Summers, 1990). 
As persuasive as these arguments may sound, we cannot ipso facto conclude that the 
foreign exchange parallel market is affected by investor sentiment. In the following 
sections, therefore, we develop and test implications of this alternative view. Our test is 
based on the empirical implications of unpredictability or randomness of changes in 
investor sentiment. 
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Unpredictabi l i ty of investor sent iment: testable 
implication 
We construct a test based on the empirical observations that investor sentiment moves in 
part unpredictably. This un-predictability contributes to resale price risk since the resale 
price of an asset depends partially on sentiment. If investor sentiment affects a broad 
range of assets (say, foreign currencies) in the same way, this risk from its unpredictability 
becomes systematic. Systematic risk has a price in equilibrium. Consequently, assets 
subject to whims of investor sentiment should yield higher average returns than similar 
assets not subject to such whims. Put differently, assets subject to unpredictable swings 
in investor sentiment must be underpriced in the market relative to their fundamental 
values. Foreign currencies are probably subject to larger fluctuations of investor sentiment 
than the local currency, naira. Therefore, equilibrium returns on foreign currencies must 
be higher than warranted by their fundamentals. 
In particular, we measure the expected rate of return based on market fundamentals 
and the required rate of return based on structural characteristics of the market such as 
whether or not speculators (liquidity traders) exist — the issue is in fact whether the 
activities of this class of speculators are significant. The intuition is that the presence of 
noise traders would cause asset prices to overreact and thus yield excess returns. On the 
other hand, equilibrium returns based on market fundamentals reward only systematic 
risks. A non trivial problem with this approach is to figure out what are the foreign 
currency fundamentals. A closely related problem is the absence of some consensus on 
hypotheses about the equilibrium exchange rate. Whereas several equilibrium return 
processes could be assumed and tested in respect of equity market, in the foreign exchange 
market, things are not so clear cut because of a lack of general agreement on the appropriate 
model of equilibrium pricing. 
Consequently, testing whether abritrageurs set the actual spot price equal to its 
equilibrium rate is difficult unless there is some consensus on what the equilibrium value 
is and how it is determined. Given that there is no agreement on the fundamental nature 
of foreign exchange risk, no adequate measure of it and no model that determines the 
equilibrium fair return for bearing the risk, testing whether risk bearing is rewarded 
efficiently is problematic (Levich, 1985). On the other hand, the theoretical justification 
for analysing international asset-pricing problems by using methods from the theory of 
finance has been demonstrated by Kouri (1977), Fama and Farber (1979), Stulz (1981, 
1982, 1984), Hodrick (1981), and Mark (1985), among others. Given these serious 
shortcomings, we proceed as follows, bearing in mind that inferences from our results 
must be circumspect. 
Empirical methodology 
Other explanations have been advanced to explain the existence (if any) of risk premium 
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in the foreign exchange market. Mark (1985) fits a model in which the desire for 
intertemporal consumption smoothing causes a risk premium to emerge in the market 
for forward foreign exchange. Frooth and Thaler (1990) survey the status of current 
models on exchange risk premiums, and find them less than satisfactory. Our empirical 
methodology is developed to account for the possible existence of a risk premium (excess 
returns), which we attribute to investor sentiments. The sentiments are noticeable if 
liquidity traders are significantly present. 
For our purpose, excess return on currency i at time t is defined as x.t. That is, it is the 
difference between EtR.f the expected return on currency i at time t (based on information 
available at time t), and r.t, the realized return on the currency within the same period. y 
is the logarithm of weekly exchange rates and 
>),= ())< - )'„ - !)• Letting ER. = £y.t, we have 
x. = (Ay. - r.), it ' •'n it-" 
with A as the differencing operator. 
Also, we postulate that if abritrageurs populate the market, they would conduct 
fundamental pricing according to a forecasting equation. Based on previous specification 
tests, we chose a simple nonstationary AR(1) process. We have: 
% = + + X c „ V V , + v„ i = l , - ,4 (6) 
7 = 1 
It is clear from Equation 6 that the fitted value of the return, Ay~f is our proxy for the 
expected return, which is then compared with the actual (or realized) return. Actual returns 
are based on the existing structure of the market, which may or may not include significant 
elements of speculative activities. The intuition is that the presence in the market of 
noise traders would cause asset prices to overreact and thus yield a risk premium. On the 
other hand, equilibrium returns that are based on market fundamentals reward only 
systematic risks.13 The null hypothesis no noise traders may be parameterized as 
and tested with the Wald test of exclusionary restrictions. The proper statistic is 
fJ =Cr, - Ay,)2 [var (r.) + var (Ay.) - 2cov (r^Ay.]^ 
where r. (i - 1,...,4) is the mean realized returns on currency I, and var () is the 
variance of the actual and the fitted returns, respectively. Under H0, the statistic co. is 
asymptotically distributed % 2 
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Data and empirical analysis 
The primary data set consists of weekly observations on the dollar, pound sterling, 
Deutsche mark and French franc covering the period January 1990 to December 1993.14 
The estimates of the excess returns and the related test statistics are reported in Table 6. 
We fail to reject the hypothesis that noise trader activities are not significant. The 
volatility cluster that is characteristic of the data set (from regression diagnostics, not 
reported) probably trace more to macroeconomic instability than from the microeconomic 
effects of market traders. It should be noted that the finding of zero risk premium obviates 
the need to determine whether indeed the excess returns are due to risk premium that 
arises from the activities of speculative traders or the desire for intertemporal consumption 
smoothing, or any of the other reasons advanced in the literature to explain the existence 
of risk premiums in the exchange market. Thus we are on less ambiguous grounds. In the 
light of the present empirical evidence and the lack of a consensus on what is the 
equilibrium value of a currency, the natural policy prescription is to ask that policy makers 
be hesitant about market interventions designed to correct distortions. This is especially 
important in the new autonomous foreign market given that it inherits many of the 
characteristics of the parallel (and free) market. This need to be hesitant on market 
interventions bears repeating because of the central bank's expressed predilection for 
occasional intervention in the foreign exchange markets.15 
Table 6: Wald test for the presence of noise traders 
Currency X CO 
Dollar 0.00026 0.000 
Sterling 0.00013 0.000 
Mark 0.00000 0.000 
Franc 0.00000 0.000 
Notes: Critical values for 1% (5%) level test are 6.63(3.84). % is the excess return, and co is the Wald-test 
statistic. 
V. Summary and conclusions 
Our study focused on two issues of market efficiency. First, we examined the possibility 
that there could be an unexploited profit opportunity in the foreign exchange parallel 
market. This opportunity for profit derives from findings (in earlier studies) that returns 
in the parallel market are predictable. Since profitable opportunities do not necessarily 
imply exploitable opportunities, however, we estimated the risk-return profile implicit 
in the parallel market. The intuition is that these apparent profitable opportunities could, 
on a risk-adjusted basis, turn out to be unattractive ventures. 
We infer that an investor who forecasts future returns from past returns, and holds a 
"market portfolio", will earn relatively unattractive risk-adjusted returns. Note, however, 
that our comparison is with results from developed markets. Therefore, the comparison 
should be viewed as only providing perspectives on the"empirical range" of risk-return 
profiles. 
Whether the standardized profit from the market is favourable to an investor depends 
on individual preferences to risk. On the ability, for example, to assess if the disutility 
from the prospect of losing $250.00 exceeds the utility associated with gaining $350.00. 
We are also mindful that there could be other (unexplored) feasible trading strategies 
that might yield higher risk-adjusted returns. Overall, it is not clear that agents who 
pursue profitable trading opportunities in the market are irrationally wasting their 
resources. Although the weight of evidence from markets worldwide seems to lean 
toward market inefficiency, it is equally not clear that agents could systematically exploit 
these apparent inefficiencies. We conclude that there is no indictment either way. Investors 
who pursue the apparent profitable opportunities, and those who do not, can find support 
for their position from available evidence. 
The second part of this study tested for the significant presence of noise traders in the 
parallel market. The noise-trader approach to finance is a recent and now popular approach 
to investigating market efficiency, different from the traditional approach that imposes 
rationality on all market participants. We find no evidence of significant speculative 
activities that may be assumed to drive prices gradually away from fundamentals 
(destabilizing expectations). The finding of no destabilizing expectations is at variance 
with Ogiogio (1994). That study considers speculative activities to be the prime movers 
of the parallel market in Nigeria. However, the present result supports Ayogu (1995), 
which finds no evidence of price bubbles in the parallel market. 
The lack of support for the presence of destabilizing expectation, the lack of evidence 
for price bubbles and the ambiguity over the ability to exploit the apparent market 
inefficiency lead us to offer the following suggestion. Policy makers are well advised 
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not to be overly concerned about the allocative implications of apparent inefficiencies 
uncovered from market studies. The same suggestion applies to a policy debate that 
seeks market intervention to counter perceived exchange rate instability from trading 
activities. We do not find support that such instability is caused by traders. Therefore, if 
the characteristics of the new autonomous market are similar to the parallel market that 
it seeks to absorb, then an activist intervention policy, based mainly on market stability 
imperatives, should be resisted strongly. 
In closing, we deem it necessary to cast a look to the future of the new foreign 
exchange market. In the new environment, forex bureaus face several challenges. First, 
decisions must be made quickly on merger prospects with parallel market operatives. 
Second, the surviving forex bureaus must confront the challenge of competing on an 
uneven playing field with banks. Third, all participants face the task of contending with 
the unknown effects of occasional central bank intervention in the currency market. 
It seems inevitable that competitive pressures will lead forex bureaus cum parallel 
market operators to cut corners to stay profitable. Economic analysis predicts that a 
change in the economic environment will stimulate a search for innovations that are 
likely to be profitable. Economic theory of regulation teaches that just as financial 
institutions change in response to regulation, the regulatory authorities change their 
regulations in response to financial innovation. Both players (regulators and regulatees) 
thus "continuously adapt to each other much like riders on a seesaw".16 Already the 
reconfiguration that occurred in the parallel market is an example of structural arbitrage. 
Kane (1984) defines structural arbitrage as adaptive changes in a firm's organizational 
form designed to lighten its tax and regulatory burdens. Because innovation lags are 
usually shorter than regulatory lags, businesses often discover and mine loopholes long 
before the regulators catch on. The challenge to regulators is to anticipate the likely 
adaptive behaviour that will inevitably arise in the new economic environment. Future 
research could focus on such strategic behaviour. 
Notes 
1. Also, see De Long Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1989, 1990b) 
2. Odubogun (1995) documents these regime shifts. 
3. The Central Bank of Nigeria reports that excess demand for currencies by banks 
amounted to US$36.9 billion for 1994; at the same time, the value of imports was 
N165.629 and N161.027 billion, respectively. As of November 1994, the parallel 
market premium was 400%, 11 months after the market became proscribed ("less 
tolerated"). The parallel market was legitimized ("more tolerated") in 1989 with 
the introduction of bureaux de change, which were established to accord legal 
recognition to small dealers in foreign exchange. The idea was that by allowing a 
free hand to small dealers, demand pressure on the official market might be 
attenuated. Furthermore, it was believed that this would increase the size of the 
formal foreign exchange market (by admitting the informal sector) and thus enhance 
macroeconomic management. These institutions were permitted to deal in 
currencies and to purchase travellers cheques but could obtain foreign currency 
only from private sources excluding resident banks and the central bank. 
4. F = (T - p) (RSSR - RSSU)/q(RSSU). RSS is the sum of squared residuals, T is the 
number of observations (sample size), p is the number of estimated parameters in 
the unrestricted regression and q is the number of parameter restrictions. 
5. Estimates of the forecast errors and correlation coefficients of the residuals are 
input variables in the solution algorithm to the problem summarized in Equation 
5. 
6. A risky asset is one whose return shows a positive variance. A diversified portfolio 
is one that contains more than one asset. The minimum-variance portfolio is the 
mix of an (efficient) portfolio that has the least possible variance. 
7. The regularity conditions placed on an investor's indifference curve by the mean-
variance theory is that the utility function shows risk aversion and that utility is 
increasing in expected return. For such individuals, indifference curves in the 
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expected return/risk space must have a positive slope. The mean-variance theory 
assumes that the investor cares only about the first two moments of the portfolio, 
and not about its covariation with other asset returns or the investor's consumption 
stream. 
8. Kamin and Ericsson (1993), Savastano (1992), Rojas-Suarez (1992), Rojas (1992), 
Melvin (1988), and Ortiz (1983) to name a few. 
9. Also, see Friedman (1953). 
10. I never found out whether he was reacting to money that could be made in the 
market through fundamental trading, or to the perceived opportunity to exploit 
what he considers to be an abundance in the market of "dumb money". 
11. Uniformed demand may be defined as changes in demand that do not plausibly 
reflect any new fundamental information. 
12. Such by the-book trading may be viewed as a variety of programmed trading. 
13. Frankel (1982) notes that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) requires an 
asset's risk premium to be systematically related to that asset's value share in 
investors' portfolio. His tests reject that prediction in the foreign exchange markets. 
14. Descriptive statistics were furnished in Table 3. 
15. NDIC Quarterly 5 (1), 1995: 6-8. 
16. Kane (1981) calls this phenomenon regulatory dialectic. 
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